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1. Introduction
1.1. Aristotle’s puzzle about lack of control in NE 7.3: the philosophical problem
Nicomachean Ethics 7.31	 is	constructed	as	a	solution	to	Aristotle’s	first	




























(NE 3.2,	 1111b13–5;	 7.8,	 1151a6–7)	 rather	 than	 against	mere	 judgment,	 and	
she	must	experience	an	internal	psychological	conflict	between	the	decision	
and	a	non-rational	desire	(e. g.,	NE 1.13,	1102b13–25).	In	the	Aristotelian	sense,	















such	 (impossible)	cases	as	 terrible	 (deinon)	 (1146b34) 8	and	astonish-
ing	(thaumaston)	(1147a9–10).9	Similarly,	when	Aristotle	introduces	his	
well-known	pattern	for	explanation	of	action	(practical	syllogism)	at	
1147a24–31,	he	asserts	 that	once	 its	 two	premises,	 the	universal	one	
(representing	 the	 agent’s	 decision	 or	 desire)	 and	 the	 particular	 one	


























12.	 See	NE 3.2,	1111b13–5;	7.8,	1151a6–7.	In	NE 7.3,	the	term	“decision”	(prohairesis) 





























people	and	 to	 teach	 them	what	 is	 this	experience	 (pathos)	which	 they	call	
being	overcome	by	pleasures	and	because	of	which	they	fail	to	do	the	best	
things,	when	they	know	what	they	are”	(Prot. 352e4–353a3).	Rather,	Socrates	
denies	 the	 truth	of	a	particular	kind	of	explanation	of	 this	experience	 that	
suggests	 that	 people	 act	 so	 because	 they	 (i. e.,	 their	 knowledge	 or	 beliefs)	













thus	 conative	psychological	 states	 that	 are	expressive	of	 the	agent’s	






The	 problem	of	 the	 uncontrolled	 agent	 is	 that	 although	 she	 has	
made	her	decision	and	 is	 convinced	about	 the	course	of	action	 she	
has	decided	for,	when	the	time	comes,	she	 fails	 to	stick	 to	 it	and	 in-
stead	does	something	else	—	typically	the	very	thing	that	she	decided	
not	 to	do.	One	could	attempt	 to	solve	 the	problem	by	claiming	that	
people	who	act	in	this	way	retract	their	previous	decisions,	and	hav-
ing	changed	their	minds,	make	a	new	one.	But	this	kind	of	solution	








interpretations	of	wish	 (including	views	 that	oppose	accounts	 that	ground	
wish	in	eudaimonia),	see	Pearson	(2012,	141–67).
15. Pistis (conviction)	 is	 tied	 to	 persuasion	 by	 reasoning	 (DA	 428a16–24).	 As	
Aristotle	says:	“Some	people	are	convinced	about	what	they	believe	no	less	
than	others	about	what	they	know”	(1146b29–30).	See	also	EE 2.10,	1226b21–
30.	This	 is	why	Aristotle	 remarks	 that	 it	does	not	matter	whether	 the	state	
(which	one	should	not	be	able	to	act	against)	amounts	to	knowledge	or	belief	
(1146b24–31).








the	 agent.	An	end	of	 this	 sort	 is	 the	object	 of	 a	 rational	 kind	of	de-




does	not	 think	or	 believe	 that	 he	 should	pursue	 it.	Note	 that	 believing	or	
thinking	that	one	should	do	something	is	here	treated	as	a	necessary	condi-
tion	for	deciding	to	do	it.
13.	 Some	 commentators	 deny	 that	 prohairesis is	 a	 desire.	 For	 example,	 Sarah	
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1.2. The problems of interpreting NE 7.3: the exegetical problem
Although	 NE 7.3	 promises	 the	 answer,	 it	 poses	 difficult	 exegetical	
problems	that	make	determining	the	answer	exceedingly	difficult.	The	














































us	 that	what	 is	 required	 for	movement	 is	 some	 form	of	 “heating	and	chill-
ing”	(MA 701a35),	one	might	form	the	view	that	only	non-rational	desires	can	
initiate	movement.	One	might	 think	 this	because	 the	processes	of	heating	
and	chilling	are	connected	with	bodily	pleasures	and	pains	and	these	plea-
sures	 and	pains	 can	 take	 the	 form	of	 various	 affections	or	 feelings	 (pathē).	
Thus	when	Aristotle	tells	us	that	affections	prepare	the	bodily	parts	(702a18)	
which	then	perform	the	actual	movements,	one	might	form	the	view	that	it	










tional	or	non-rational)	 initiate	movement,	 this	 line	of	 thought	need	not	be	































that	Aristotle	 suggests,	 despite	 the	 contradictory	 appearances	 in	 the	
“two-syllogism”	 passage,	 that	while	 acting	without	 control	 the	 agent	
does	not	have	or	is	not	using	the	relevant	particular	premise.	
1.3. The main interpretative strategies 
The	interpretative	strategies28	that	have	been	explored	in	the	literature	
divide	according	to	whether	they	do	or	do	not	allow	the	uncontrolled	
































































and	 that	 is	also	needed	 if	one	 is	 to	act	according	 to	 the	universal	premise.	
The	agent	 fails	 to	 realize	 that	she	 is	 the	sort	of	person	whom	the	decision	
concerns	 since	appetite	makes	 the	agent	 forget	 that.	The	upshot	 is	 that	 al-
though	 the	 agent	may	 perfectly	well	 know	 all	 the	 good	 premises	 and	 the	
good	conclusion,	they	lose	any	practical	import	for	him.	I	may	know	that	one	
should	not	eat	 sweets	 (and	 so	one	 should	not	eat	 the	 sweets	 that	 I	 see	 in	
front	of	me)	but	that	would	only	apply	to	me	if	I	was	interested	in	my	health.	








by	 chance)	of	 the	universal	premise	 (as	 the	physical	 account	 suggests	 she	
does),	if	she	does	not	know	or	has	forgotten	that	it	applies	to	her?	
33.	 Sarah	Broadie	attempts	 to	deal	with	 this	problem	by	proposing	 that	 in	NE 
7.3	the	expressions	“knowledge	is	used”	and	“knowledge	is	active”	(or	“con-
templated”)	 are	 not	 interchangeable	 (Broadie	 and	 Rowe	 [54–57;	 391–94]).	
She	interprets	“used”	as	meaning	“used	as	it	should	be	used,”	and	“active”	as	
meaning	“to	be	acted	upon.”	Hence,	when	at	1147a33	Aristotle	says	that	“this	












so	 is	generally	explained	by	her	 failure	 to	grasp,	or	actively	hold	 in	
mind,	one	of	the	relevant	premises.	In	other	words,	the	cause	of	the	










acts	as	 she	does,	because	she	 is	 solely	 focused	on	 the	attractive	 fea-
ture	of	what	she	desires,	ignoring	or	not	being	aware	that	the	object	
also	has	a	feature	that	made	her	decide	against	it.	The	problem	is	that	







Another	 solution	 has	 been	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 premise	 is	 active,	
but	not	 in	 relation	 to	one’s	decision,	but	only	 to	one’s	appetite,	hav-
ing	been	“hijacked”	by	it.	One	problem	with	a	view	along	these	lines	
is	 that	 it	 is	 unclear	 how	 the	 uncontrolled	 agent	 can	 use	 the	 same	
29.	Examples	include:	Price	(2006);	Grgić	(2002);	Gosling	(1990);	Mele	(1985).
30.	For	a	classic	statement	of	this	view,	see	Robinson	(1969).	




it	 could	do	so	 is	by	making	 the	agent	 ignore	 the	 relevant	particular	
premise.36	But	then,	similarly	to	the	preceding	case,	we	need	an	expla-
nation	of	how	appetite	can	make	one	unaware	of	some	feature	of	one’s	






























these	 lines.	 First,	 there	 is	 no	 viable	 explanation	 of	 how	 the	 uncon-
trolled	agent	suddenly	becomes	unaware	or	unable	 to	grasp	 the	 rel-
evant	premise	—	especially	since	it	is	quite	possible	(as	well	as	highly	
probable)	 that	 the	 agent	 has	made	 her	 decision	 (i. e.,	 the	 universal	
premise	—	say,	not	to	eat	sweets)	in	view	of	her	awareness	that	there	






In	 view	of	 these	problems,	 a	 recent	 approach,	developed	by	 Jen-







her	 decision	 on	 account	 of	 her	 appetite.	One	 problem	with	 this	 in-
terpretation	 is	 that	 the	 uncontrolled	 agent	 does	 not	 act	 against	 her	
decision	in	the	way	in	which	her	action	would	qualify	as	a	case	of	lack	
of	control	—	as	opposed	to,	for	example,	a	case	of	mere	forgetfulness,	
than	 as	 an	 alternative	 expression	 for	 “use.”	 In	 the	 next	 passage	 (1146b35–
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that	 would	 satisfy	 it)	 as	 they	 must	 be	 present	 in	 the	 uncontrolled	








important	 roles)	 and	 avoids	 the	 various	 exegetical	 problems	 I	 have	
mentioned	above.
















nitive	 condition	 from	which	 condition	 the	 agent	 recovers	 after	 the	
uncontrolled	action	(1147b6–9).39












writings.40	As	 it	 turns	out,	 the	uncontrolled	agent,	while	acting	with-
38.	The	best	example	of	this	interpretation	is	developed	in	Charles	(1984,	109–
160).	See	also	Charles	(2009)	and	Dahl	(1984).
39.	One	possibility	would	be	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 agent’s	 knowledge	or	 decision	























would	not	have	poured	herself	 a	 glass.	And	 if	 she	poured	herself	 a	
glass	without	being	absent-minded,	 this	could	be	best	explained	by	
her	re-evaluating	her	original	decision.



















prompts the	 agent	 to	 succumb	 to	 the	 non-rational	 desire.	However,	
in	referring	the	reader	to	“physiologists”	(1147b9)	for	this	account,	he	









not	using	one’s	knowledge.	 I	argue	 that	 the	 third	way	 is	 the	clue	 to	
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fact	 that	one’s	knowledge	 is	 applicable.	On	 the	contrary,	 it	 involves	
acting	as	one	knows	or	believes	one	should	not	act	when	one	knows	
one	should	not	act	that	way	(e. g.,	1146b34).43 
2.2. The third way of having but not using knowledge (1147a10–7)
Aristotle	thus	introduces	yet	another	way	of	having	but	not	using	one’s	




but	 not	 using,	 the	 state	 (tēn hexin)44	 can	 differ,	 so	 that	
someone	both	has	[knowledge]	 in	a	way	and	also	does	
not	have	it,	as	with	someone	who	is	asleep,	mad,	or	drunk	





























of	wine,	 because	 she	 temporarily	 forgets	 (being	 too	 intent	 on	 argu-
ing	her	case)	that	she	herself	has	to	drive	later	that	day.	She	thus	acts	
against	knowledge	to	which	she	is	actively	attending.42 












edge	or	premise	at	the	time	one	acts.	It	 is	 left	open	whether	it	 is	be-
cause	the	agent	does	not	know,	temporarily	forgets,	or	some	cognitive	
failure	is	in	place.	Actions	in	which	one	acts	against	knowledge	in	this	






















Despite	 some	 terminological	differences,	 the	 states	of	mind	 that	Ar-
istotle	mentions	 in	 this	passage	are	 identical	 to	 the	conditions	men-






surely	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 articulation	 of	 the	 same	 thought,	Aristotle	
49.	 Perhaps	the	only	obvious	point	of	the	analogy	is	that	it	compares	or	likens	the	
ways	in	which	the	people	in	the	grip	of	passions	(and	so	also	the	uncontrolled	






































But	Aristotle’s	 point	 is	 that	 people	 sometimes	 experience	 emotions	which	
are	such	that	they	disturb	their	bodies	and	minds	to	the	extent	that	they	can	
sometimes	“even	produce	fits	of	madness.”	In	saying	this,	he	makes	clear	that	
he	has	 in	mind	 cases	 in	which	 emotions	have	decisive	 influence	over	 the	
agent’s	rational	abilities.









same	way	(ton auton tropon echei).	His	point	concerns	only	the	way	they	have	
but	do	not	use	their	knowledge.
	 jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control
philosophers’	imprint	 –		12		– vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015)
that	 the	 conditions	 of	 being	 drunk,	 mad,	 and	 asleep	 have	 in	 com-
mon:	 they	 are	 global	 conditions	 affecting	 the	 agent’s	 knowledge	 in-

























53.	 Although	 it	 is	generally	not	 the	best	practice	 to	use	doctrines	 from	Magna 
Moralia as	evidence,	in	this	case	it	seems	to	me	that	we	are	entitled	to	do	so	








Aristotle	would	use	 these	 two	words,	 in	 the	same	contexts,	 to	mark	
distinct	states.50	In	any	case,	my	interpretation	of	the	analogy	does	not	
require	 that	 the	agent	 is	dead	drunk	(in	 fact,	 this	would	undermine	


































any	 such	 general	 incapacitation	 of	 reason	 or	mind	would	 require	 a	
rather	intense	onset	of	emotions	and	that	this	would	severely	restrict	
the	kind	of	uncontrolled	behavior	Aristotle’s	theory	(as	I	interpret	it)	
can	explain.	Second,	one	might	 think	 that	 the	very	 idea	of	 the	 inca-





do	 not	 stick	 to	 the	 results	 of	 their	 deliberation	 on	 account	 of	 affec-


























enness	 or	 appetite)	 brings	 reasoning	 to	 a	 standstill.55	We	must	 con-
clude	that	Aristotle	thinks	that	the	agents	in	the	various	conditions	he	
mentions	cannot	access	or	make	use	of	their	knowledge	because those	




















pleasures	 that	are	proper	 to	 it.	There	are	pleasures	arising	 from	study	and	






this	 passage	 focuses	 on	 the	 vicious	 or	 intemperate	 people,	 it	 nevertheless	
provides	evidence	that	Aristotle	thinks	that	appetites	or	desires	have	the	abil-
ity	to	disable	one’s	capacity	to	reason.








tionally	 and	voluntarily acts	 against	 one’s	 better	 judgment.	 It	 is	 then	
assumed	 that	 intentional	 and	voluntary	action	entails,	 among	other	
things,	that	one’s	capacity	to	reason,	deliberate,	or	perform	logical	in-
ferences	has	not	been	compromised.	In	view	of	this	conception,	the	






and the Irrational,	E.	R.	Dodds	not	only	correctly	 identifies	Aristotle’s	
claim	at	1147a10–7	as	entailing	a	temporary	suspension	of	one’s	(ratio-
nal)	mind,59	but	also	traces	the	quite	general	view	that	various	kinds	















likely	 to	 suffer	 from	 impetuous	 lack	 of	 control	 because	
the	former’s	[appetites]	are	so	quick	and	the	latter’s	so	in-
tense	that	they	do	not	wait	for	reason	on	account	of	their	
tendency	to	follow	phantasia (dia to akolouthētikai einai tē 
phantasia).	(NE 7.7,	1150b25–28)
The	passage	 clearly	makes	 room	 for	 other	 kinds	of	 agents	 (than	
the	excitable	and	volatile)	who	can	sometimes	be	prone	to	instances	
of	 impetuous	uncontrolled	action57	 and	 these	agents	need	not	have	
particularly	intense	desires.	The	passage	mentions	people	who	have	








acterized	by	strong	and,	for that reason, uncontrollable	emotions	or	de-
sires,	but	as	a	condition	 in	which	one	 fails	 to	control	desires	which	







is,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 uncontrolled	 agent,	 particularly	 susceptible	 to	






























information	 in	 the	way	 in	which	 its	use	would	qualify	her	as	having	
understanding	(rather	than	mere	knowledge)	of	what	she	is	doing.	
65.	 Perhaps	most	strikingly	at	DA 433a10–1.	See	also	Insomn. 459a1–8	(translated	
below).	There	is	an	instructive	passage	in	Prob. 903b29–26:	“Why	are	those	
who	hesitate	 in	 their	 speech	melancholic?	 Is	 it	because	being	melancholic	
they	quickly	follow	phantasia (akolouthein tē phantasia),	and	this	is	character-
istic	of	those	who	hesitate	in	their	speech.	For	the	impulse	to	speak	rushes	
before	their	ability	to	do	so,	just	as	the	soul	too	quickly	follows	phantasia (tō 
phanenti).	 The	 same	 thing	 happens	with	 those	who	 lisp.	 For	 the	 parts	 [re-
sponsible	for	speech]	are	too	slow.	A	sign	of	this	is	that	people	who	are	drunk	
(oinōmenoi)	 become	 lispers,	 since	 then	 they	 follow	 phainomena most	 of	 all	

























“extinguish	and	expel	thought” (houtōs apesbese kai exēlasen ho phobos to noēma).




appearances	 taking	place	 at	 all.	 In	 fact,	 given	 the	 very	 striking	 similarities	
that	her	interpretation	bears	to	my	account,	there	should	be	no	need	to	for	
such	distortions	 since	 the	work	 is	done	by	 the	disablement	of	 reason	and	
not	by	perceptual	or	evaluative	illusions.	I	suspect	that	the	main	reason	she	































67.	The	translation	is	that	of	D.	Gallop,	Aristotle: On Sleep and Dreams (Warminster,	
1996),	slightly	modified.





























Passages	3	and	5	suggest	 that	 the	explanation	of	why	 the	uncon-
trolled	 agent’s	 action	 seems	 irrational	 is	 that	 instead	 of	 acting	 ac-
cording	to	her	knowledge	or	rationally	grounded	beliefs	she	“follows	
phantasia.”66	A	clue	to	understanding	this	expression	is	given	in	a	pas-
















drunk),	what	people	 recognize	as	salient	 features	of	 their	 situations	
are	not	features	that	are	(or	would	be)	salient	according	to	their	rea-












do	 (DA 433b5–10).	 She	 does	 not	 act	 on	 her	 decision	 that	 she	 had	






because	of	 their	drunkenness:	“Why	is	 it	 that	one	who	is	 tipsy	(akrothōrax)	




































This	 judgment	 is	 not	 dependent	 on	 one’s	 desires	 concerning	Coris-
cus:	in	fact,	one	has	to	form	the	appropriate	belief	in	view	of	the	facts	
and	despite	the	appearance	(DA 427b21–2).	This	contrasts	with	cases	
























at	 every	 period	 of	 [human]	 life,	 nor	 in	 a	 human	 being	
in	 all	 states:	 for	 neither	 is	 deliberation	 nor	 a	 supposi-
tion	about	the	why:	nothing	prevents	that	many	people	
might	well	have	a	belief	 (doxa)	about	whether	 to	do	or	












case	of	action	 just	 is,	 as	he	explains,	 the	 reason	 for	one’s	action)	as 
being	that	which	makes	and	explains	the	action	as	good	for	oneself.	
One	decides	on	an	action	because	one	believes	that	the	action	stands	























it	 good	 and	 good	 for	 oneself.	 For	 example,	 in	 order	 for	 one	 to	 aim	
at	justice	independently	of	pleasures	or	pains	associated	with	just	or	













2.4. Knowledge vs. experience
Although	a	disablement	of	reason	of	this	sort	has	direct	consequenc-
es	for	the	agent’s	ability	to	be	motivated	by	goodness	(as	opposed	to	
mere	 pleasure),	 it	 has	 far	 less	 serious	 consequences	 for	 the	 agent’s	







but	which	 nevertheless	 involve	 awareness	 of	 how	 one	 can	 achieve	
some	desired	goal.
At	the	most	basic	level	(BL),	one	can	become	aware,	on	the	basis	




73.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 Aristotle	 is	 happy	 to	 allow	 that	 some	 agents	 can	
stick	to	their	decisions	even while	their	reasoning	power	is	suspended.	But	
in	 such	 a	 case,	 they	 are	not	 strictly	 speaking	 acting	on	 the	decision	 itself	
(i. e.,	they	are	not	acting	from reason).	Rather,	they	are	acting	in	such	a	way	
because	they	enjoy something	that	acting	in	such	a	way	brings,	such	as	vic-













provides	one	with	 reasons	 to	perform	 this (rather	 than	 some	other)	







(8)	All	 other	 [i. e.,	 non-natural]	 comings-to-be	 (geneseis)	
are	 called	 productions	 (poiēseis).	 And	 all	 productions	
are	either	 from	art	 (apo technēs) or	 from	a	 capacity	 (apo 
dunameōs)	 or	 from	 thought	 (apo dianoias).	 ….from	 art	




be	as	 the	 result	of	 the	 following	 train	of	 thought:	 since	
this is	health,	 if	 the	 thing	 is	 to	be	healthy	 this must	first	
be	present,	e. g.	a	uniform	state	of	body,	and	if	 this	 is	 to	
be	present,	there	must	be	heat;	and	one	goes	on	always	
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tasiai (Mem. 451a14–7).	Once	 one	 accumulates	many	memories	 of	 a	
certain	 sort,	 they	 give	 rise	 to	 experience	 (Post. An.100a2–5).	 Experi-




































leads	 to	 a	 desired	 result	 and	 grasp,	 in	 addition,	 that	 the	 action	 is	 a	
means	to	that	result.	In	this	case,	one	grasps	the	action	as useful.	This	
stage	 is	 a	 vast	 improvement	 over	 the	 previous	 one	 since	 one	 now	
becomes	 aware	 that	 one	 could	 try	 other	means	 should	 the	 current	












This	 second	 way	 (CL)	 of	 grasping	 something	 as	 useful	 (or	 as	 a	
means)	is	both	highly	complex	and,	according	to	Aristotle,	quite	com-





cumulation	 of	 the	 corresponding	memories	 (Post.	An.100a2–5). The	
retained	sensory	impressions	that	constitute	one’s	memories	are	phan-
74.	The	 relevant	 aspects	 of	Aristotle’s	 theory	 of	 non-rational	 cognition	 can	be	
gleaned	from	Met. 1.1	and	Post. An. 2.19.	In	my	explanation	of	Aristotle’s	theory	
of	phantasia and	experience,	I	follow	Frede	(1996).	For	an	account	of	phantasia 
consistent	with	my	account	of	lack	of	control,	see	Lorenz	(2009,	148–73).




her	decision	 is	based	—	that	 is,	 she	 is	able	 to	contemplate	 the	cause.	
In	the	absence	of	such	an	active	grasp,	her	decision	ceases	to	be	an	
active	conative	psychological	state	and	the	way	is	cleared	for	bad	ap-
petite	 to	 issue	 in	action.	 In	acting	on	her	appetite,	 the	uncontrolled	








If	 the	 interpretation	 so	 far	 is	 along	 the	 right	 lines,	 then	Aristotle	
distinguishes	between,	on	the	one	hand,	merely	having	thoughts	(or	
a	 train	of	 thoughts)	 and,	on	 the	other	hand,	having	 thoughts	while	
also	contemplating	the	explanatory	and	inferential	or	conceptual	con-









represents	 things	as	pleasant)	 and	a	weak	phantasia logistikē	 (which	 repre-
sents	things	as	good).	During	the	uncontrolled	action,	the	agent’s	faculty	of	
phantasia logistikē	 is	disabled	by	 the	strong	phantasia aisthêtikê.	His	view	is	
attractive	but	it	faces	a	number	of	problems.	In	DA 434a6–7,	which	contains	
the	reference	to	phantasia logistikē,	Aristotle	does	not	specify	its	content.	It	
might	 simply	be	a	 representation	of	different	 courses	of	 action	 to	oneself	
according	 to	 one’s	 deliberation	without	 representing	 them	 as	 good	—	that	
determination	can	still	be	the	work	of	rational	judgment.	It	is	also	not	clear	

















trolled	action	does	not	 concern	either	of	 these	 two	non-rational	 (in	
Aristotle’s	sense	of	the	term)	forms	of	practical	cognition	(BL	and	CL)	
since	neither	of	them	involves	an	active	grasp	of	the	reasons	in	the	strict	












drunk,	or	 asleep	 insofar	 she	 temporarily	 cannot	exercise	her	knowl-
edge.	She	cannot	do	so	because	her	reasoning	power	has	been	tempo-
rarily	disabled	by	her	appetite.	As	a	consequence	of	the	disablement	of	
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That	my	 interpretation	 so	 far	 is	 along	 the	 right	 lines	 is	well	 sup-
ported	by	the	next	passage	in	NE 7.3	in	which	Aristotle	compares	un-
controlled	agents	to	early	learners:
(10)	 Saying	 words	 that	 come	 from	 knowledge	 proves	
nothing.	 For	 people	 in	 these	 affective	 states	 can	 recite	
the	demonstrations	and	verses	of	Empedocles,	and	those	















having	 any	 understanding	 of	what	 they	 say.	 Similarly,	 people	who	


































(i. e.,	 having	understanding),	 he	 can	 and	does	 express	 this	 thought	 by	 say-
ing	 that	 the	agent	both	has	knowledge	 in	a	way,	but	also	does	not	have	 it	
(1147a12–3).
80.	Leibniz held	a	view	similar.	In	Principes de la Nature et de la Grace,	he	claims	
that	the	difference	between	reason	strictly	speaking	and	a	certain	semblance	
of	reason	(which	is	an	exercise	of	a	highly	developed	capacity	of	memory)	



















































































drunkenness	and,	hence,	also	of	 the	 incapacitations	of	one’s	 rational	
capacities	that	Aristotle	describes	in	the	De Somno and	De Insomniis. 
Aristotle’s	 thought,	 then,	 is	 that	 the	disablement	of	 reason	 in	un-


































2.5. The transition from sticking to one’s decision to acting without control
Although	we	now	have	 an	 explanation	 of	 how	 it	 is	 that	 the	 uncon-
trolled	agent	acts	during uncontrolled	action	(i. e.,	we	now	know	what	
his	state	of	mind	is),	we	still	do	not	know	why	such	temporary	suspen-




porary	disablements	of	 reason	 in	 the	other	 conditions	he	mentions.	
Some	of	them	happen	as	parts	of	people’s	natural	day-cycle	(such	as	
sleep),	but	 some	are	 the	 results	of	various	external	 influences	or	 in-
ternal	 imbalances.	When	one	 reads	about	 the	causes	and	processes	
that	are	involved	in	the	transitions	from	being	in	possession	of	one’s	
rational	 faculties	 to	 their	disablement,	one	gets	 a	 story	 about	differ-
ent	flows	of	exhalations,	heat,	and	blood	in	one’s	body	that	cause	the	








or	 painful	 (MA 8,	 701b33–7).	 As	Aristotle	 further	 tells	 us,	 the	 cogni-
tion	of	something	as	pleasant	or	painful,	whether	it	comes	from	direct	














formation	 of	 beliefs	 contains	 two	 relevantly	 connected	 beliefs,	 one	







one	needs	 to	 show	how	 the	 action	 follows	 from	 the	 agent’s	 beliefs	
85.	There	 is	a	question	about	how	to	 translate	 “ἡ	μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ’ 




my	translation,	we	get:	 “For	one	belief	 is	a	universal	belief.”	 I	do	not	 think	
that	much	hangs	on	this	issue	here.	The	sentence	says	in	the	first	clause	that	
whatever	the	subject	is,	is	a	belief.	This	issue	can	be	important	if	one	wants	
to	argue	 that	when	Aristotle	 later	 (at	 1147b9)	uses	 the	expression	 “the	 last	
proposition”	 (hē teleutaia protasis)	he	 refers	 to	 a	 conclusion	of	 the	practical	
syllogism.	For	if	we	take	the	noun	that	is	to	be	understood	with	the	feminine	






performs	such	 that	 that	act	 (of	choosing,	 forming	an	 intention,	 refo-
cusing	one’s	attention,	etc.)	is	different	from	the	basic	desire	that	mo-
tivates	her	action.	This	additional	psychic	act	is	the	cause	of	the	akratic 

























action.	 I	 begin	with	 a	 translation	of	 the	 immediately	 preceding	pas-
sage	in	which	Aristotle	introduces	the	“practical	syllogism”:













simple	issue	of	the	sense	of	mē kōluomenon (not	being	prevented)	 in	













ing	 acting	 or	moving	 (e. g.,	De Caelo 311a20;	DA 404a14,	 417a28;	HA 
609b21;	Met. 1148a17).	Aristotle	thus	often	uses	it	to	describe	the	activ-
ity	of	something	that	compels	(De Motu 701a16;	Met. 1015a27,	1023a17)	
something	else	to	act	or	move	against	its	own	impulse.	As	he	makes	





makes	 use	 of	 two	 propositions,	 one	 of	which	 (the	 universal)	 repre-
sents	 the	 relevant	 feature	 of	 the	 agent’s	 state	 of	mind	 (for	 example,	






















happen	 in	order	 to	 achieve	a	goal	 specified	 in	 the	universal	premise)	 and	
so	 the	 question	of	whether	 or	 not	 it	 can	be	 used	 that	way	 is	 not	 relevant	
here.	Similarly,	it	is	irrelevant	whether	the	agent	is	explicitly	connecting	the	
premises	together	so	as	to	make	an	inference	to	a	conclusion.	The	important	











































word	 order	 to	 prevent	 this	 translation.	 The	 interpretation	 of	 tōn moriōn	 as	
referring	to	rational	vs.	non-rational	part	of	 the	soul	seems	natural	 in	view	







factors	external	 to	her	own	agency	 (even	 if	 they	are	 internal	 to	her	
body)	—	namely,	 the	material	processes	associated	with	her	appetite.	
Finally,	 in	 its	passive	 form	(which	 is	 the	one	used	 in	our	passage	 in	
NE 7.3),	Aristotle	uses	the	word	exclusively	to	describe	external	factors	






Aristotle	now	proceeds	 to	use	 the	pattern	 to	describe	 the	uncon-
trolled	agent’s	state	of	mind:
(12)	So	when	there	is	in	the	agent	on	the	one	hand	a	uni-








following	 certain	 states	 or	 emotions.	 This	 is	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 expres-







that	 reason	and	emotions	are	 treated	as	 two	agents	preventing	each	other	
from	doing	something	and	so	as	being	external	to	each	other.	
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There	has	been	much	discussion	 in	 the	 literature	about	 the	final	












and	 the	 immediately	preceding	passage	 (NE 7.3,	 1147a25–31),	which	








92.	 It	may	be	objected	 that	when	Aristotle	 says,	 in	 the	 two-syllogism	passage	
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tween	 the	 impetuous	and	 the	weak	uncontrolled	agent.	 It	might	be	
thought	that	even	if	my	interpretation	works	well	for	the	impetuous	










agent’s	decision	 loses	 its	motivational	efficacy	does	not	concern	 the	










perience	allows	one	 to	 reason,	as	 I	 explained	above).	But	 that	does	
not	mean	 that	 she	 also	has,	 at	 that	moment,	 active understanding	 of	
95.	 The	syllogistic	apparatus	introduced	in	NE 7.3	is	 in	any	case	interpreted	as	
representing	 an	 explanation	 of	 an	 action	 rather	 than	 an	 actual	 process	 of	
thought.	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 there	 is	 one	 syllogism	 that	 explains	 the	









osition”	refers	 to	 the	particular	premise	(and	so	the	passage	has	 led	













94.	That	 the	phrase	refers	 to	 the	particular	premise	 is	 the	 traditional	view.	For	
arguments	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 view	 that	 it	 refers	 to	 the	 conclusion	 see	Hardie	
(1981,	287–289)	and	especially	Charles	(1984,	120–121).	One	can	argue	that	
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The	 phrase	 “the	 affective	 state	 does	 not	 come	 about	when	what	
seems	to	be	knowledge	 in	 the	primary	sense	 is	present”	has	 looked	
implausible	to	many	commentators.	On	most	interpretations	the	only	























cal	one	too).	 If	anything,	hers	 is	a	 failure	of	character	 insofar	as	her	




At	 the	very	end	of	NE 7.3,	Aristotle	 famously	returns	 to	Socrates’	ac-
count	and	compares	it	to	his	own:	
(15)	And	since	 the	 last	 term	does	not	seem	to	be	either	
universal	 or	 as	 expressive	 of	 knowledge	 as	 the	 univer-






about	 knowing	 and	 not	 knowing,	 and	 about	 how	 it	 is	
possible	act	without	control	while	still	being	in	a	state	of	
knowledge.	(NE 7.3,	1147b13–7)









about	 is	 also	not	present	as	 knowledge	when	 the	agent	 is	 in	 the	af-
fective	state.	If	the	knowledge	that	is	not	present	is	said	to	be	active	
knowing,	then	it	is	just	as	true	that	knowledge	of	the	universal	term	
is	 inactive	as	 it	 is	 that	knowledge	of	 the	particular	premise	 (percep-
tual	 knowledge)	 is	 inactive.	However,	 the	 information	 contained	 in	
the	particular	premise	is	utilized	by	the	appetite	in	the	uncontrolled	
action.	Perceptual	knowledge	is	dragged	about	in	this	sense.101
5. Are uncontrolled actions voluntary?
Does	Aristotle’s	 theory	 of	 uncontrolled	 action	manage	 to	 avoid	 the	








Aristotle	 contrast	 active	 knowledge	 with	 perceptual	 knowledge,	 and	 that	
does	not	 seem	be	as	proper	a	contrast	as	 that	between	universal	and	par-






























ing	[to	his	knowledge],	and	 is	 in	actuality	and	 in	 the	primary	sense	
knowing”	(DA	2.5,	417a28–9).	This	supports	the	claim	that	in	our	pas-











100.		Most	 commentators	 think	 of	 “knowledge	 in	 the	 primary	 sense”	 here	 as	
knowledge	 of	 the	 universal	 premise.	 Burnet	 (1900,	 305)	 interprets	 it	 as	
knowledge	where	all	the	terms	are	universals,	i. e.	scientific	knowledge.	
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pertaining	 to	 that	 capacity.	 For	 example,	 if	 one	 is	 acting	 as	 a	 physi-
cian,	then	there	are	certain	standards	that	one	is	expected	to	fulfill.	If	
one	does	not	 fulfill	 them	one	can	be	 justly	held	 responsible	 for	 the	







be	 said	 to	have	 acted	 in	 ignorance,	 but	 in	 another	way	
not;	 for	 example,	 if	 he	 failed	 to	 use	 his	 knowledge	 be-
cause	 of	 negligence.	 Likewise,	 too,	 someone	would	 be	



























the	uncontrolled	action	 is	not	 forced	since	 its	causal	origin	 is	 in	the	
agent	(i. e.,	the	agent’s	appetite).	The	second	condition,	at	least	in	the 
Nicomachean Ethics, cannot	be	understood	as	 requiring	 that	 in	order	
to	act	voluntarily	one	has	to	have	knowledge (strictly	speaking)	of	the	
particulars	since	both	children	and	animals	act	voluntarily	(111a25–30,	
1111b5–10).	 If	 the	 condition	 is,	 accordingly,	 understood	 as	 requiring	
that	 the	 agent	 is	 aware	of	 the	particulars,	my	 view	 satisfies	 it	 since	
the	uncontrolled	agent	is	perfectly	well	aware	of	the	particulars	of	her	
situation	and	action.	It	is	notable	that	the	list	of	particulars	at	1111a2–6	
does	not	 include	 knowledge	of	 the	why	 (dia ti).104	As	Aristotle	 says,	
“nothing	prevents	that	the	many	have	a	belief	that	something	should	

























Bostock,	 David.	 (2000).	Aristotle’s Ethics. Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	
Press.
















take	care	 to	not	become	 the	kind	of	person	 she	now	 is.	The	uncon-
trolled	 agent’s	 condition	 is	 not	 the	 result	 of	 any	 particular	 external	
(overstraining)	circumstances	since	 if	 that	were	 the	case,	everybody	
would	be	uncontrolled	in	those	circumstances.	It	is	the	result	of	a	life	
in	which	the	agent	did	not	apply	herself	enough	to	the	proper	habitu-
ation	 of	 her	 appetites.	 Since	 habituation	 is	 realized	 not	 just	 during	
childhood,	 but	 also	 (and	 especially)	 during	 adulthood	 through	 the	
conditioning	of	one’s	 soul	 through	 reasoned	decisions,	 it	was	up	 to	
her	to	take	care.	The	uncontrolled	agent’s	failure	to	resist	is,	in	a	way,	











path	 between	 the	 Socratic	 theory	which	 denied	 any	 overcoming	 of	
reason	by	emotions	and	the	more	ordinary	view	which	affirmed	such	
overcoming.	However,	 this	ancient	element	 is	 supported	by	psycho-
logical	theory	that	has	a	far	more	contemporary	ring	to	it.	That	theory	
107.	See	also	NE 7.7,	1150b6–15.
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